Includes bibliographical references ( pages [159]-167) and index.

Machine generated contents note: -- 1. Value and Normativity1.1 Introduction1.2 Which Evaluations?1.3 The Idea of Value Theory1.4 Value and Normativity1.5 Overview1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality1.7 Value Theory: The Questions2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co.2.1 Introduction2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value2.4 The Reduction to Facts2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value?2.7 Summary3. The Challenge against Absolute Value3.1 Introduction3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness3.3 Foot and the Virtues3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes3.7 Summary4. Personal Value4.1 Introduction4.2 Moore on Good and Good For4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes4.4 Moore Strikes Back?4.5 Agent-relative Value4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative4.7 Summary5. The Chemistry of Value5.1 Introduction5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations5.3 Organic Unities5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value5.6 Holism and Particularism5.7 Summary6. Value Relations6.1 Introduction6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity6.6 Parity and Choice6.7 Parity and Incomparability6.8 Summary7. How Do I Favour Thee?7.1 Introduction7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value?7.5 Summary8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons8.1 Introduction8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response8.5 Reasons for What?8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority8.8 Summary.